Building a Better Voting Machine

Wired News has a really nice article by Kim Zetter about electronic voting, and what we can hope to do about it by 2008. It is based largely on advice from Professors Ed Felten and David Wagner.

It's been six years since the Florida presidential fiasco launched a flurry of spending around the country to replace antiquated punch-card and lever voting machines with expensive new electronic touch-screen machines. Yet new controversies over the security of e-voting machines continue to crop up, making it clear that the new machines are just as problematic as the ones they replaced.

Why can't the voting machine companies get it right?

With election season upon us, Wired News spoke with two of the top computer scientists in the field, UC Berkeley's David Wagner and Princeton's Ed Felten, and came up with a wish list of features we would include in a voting machine, if we were asked to create one.

These recommendations can't guarantee clean results on their own. Voting machines, no matter how secure, are no remedy for poor election procedures and ill-conceived election laws. So our system would include thorough auditing and verification capabilities and require faithful adherence to good election practices, as wells as topnotch usability and security features.

Here, then, is our nomination for the best voting machine for 2008. Use the comments tool below to tell us how your perfect voting machine would look...

Combine the best features of touch-screen and optical-scan machines in a single device...

Eliminate removable memory cards...

Simplify voting machine software to use minimal lines of code...

Make self-policing software...

Create transparent code...

Employ mandatory audits...

Random spot checks...

Post-election hand audits...

Post-election voter verification...

In the meantime, [Felten] says, all we can do is take steps to "reduce the window of vulnerability (with elections) -- not to zero, but to far below where it is now."